

[Note]

# The shaping of Japan between 1868 and 1945:

— Effects of the Japanese drive to ‘ catch up ’ with the West —

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## INTRODUCTION

On September 2, 1945, Japanese General Yoshijiro Umezu and American General Douglas MacArthur signed the Instrument of Surrender on board the battleship *Missouri* anchored in Tokyo Bay. But Japan was reminded of another historical event which was the arrival on July 2, 1853 of American Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his squadron of four Black Ships (*kurofune*), dropping anchor in the very same bay, with the mission to open up the country. Even the flag flying above the signing parties was Perry's original thirty-one-star one (Feifer 2006). But who could have anticipated that Japan would transform itself in less than 100 years, from a semi-feudal state into a country able to challenge modern Western powers?

The *Perry* shock was a major historical event which prompted the fall of Tokugawa Shogunate (*Bakufu*) and triggered the Meiji Restoration. Indeed, forced to open their doors after more than 200 years of relative isolation (*Sakoku*), the Japanese leaders realized their vulnerability and decided to ‘ catch up ’ with the West (or a certain representation of it) to avoid meeting the same fate as China which was being broken up at that time by imperialist Western countries.

I will show here how that race for power enabled Japan to become modern, transforming it into an imperialist nation-state (1868-1920's), and also how the conditions of its formation played a role in its rejection of the West, and led to wars which followed (1930's-1945). For the sake of convenience, I will divide my analysis into three specific domains — the State (and economy); the Military (and colonies); the Nation (and Emperor) — and show briefly their interactions according to imperial eras: the road to the nation-state during the Meiji era; the ending of the ‘ catching up ’ move in the Taishō era; and the rejection of the ‘ West ’ and the Shōwa wars. Consequences for contemporary Japan will then be summed up in the conclusion.

## THE END OF EDO AND THE MEIJI RESTORATION

Among the reasons often put forward to explain the fall of the Shogunate, the following ones are crucial in understanding the later stages in modern Japanese history (Appendix 1).

The economic situation of Japan was worsening as a result of endemic corruption and the rising rate of expenditure of the *Shōgun* as well as most of the domain lords (*daimyō*). Taxes, droughts, and famines provoked rural riots — getting all the more violent and frequent at the end of the Shogunate. Lower-ranking samurai were no more satisfied with their lot. The lavish way of life of their high-ranked commanders, and also the lack of opportunities for advancement were both reasons of resentment toward

the system. Their frustration peaked when Tokugawa gave in to foreign demands, i.e. consenting to sign the *Unequal Treaties* (Appendix 2) (Hane 2001: 57-60; Yamamura 1997: 211-220).

Yet the Shogunate had not much choice in the matter. The British victory over the Chinese empire in the first Opium War (1839-1842) had been shocking news for them, and the danger of being colonised by a Western power became even clearer eleven years later, when Commodore Perry arrived in Uraga Harbor near Edo, with a squadron of four war ships — two large side-wheel steamers and two heavily gunned sloops-of-war. The next year, the so-called Harris Treaty was therefore signed, and Japan was forced to open several ports to Western traders, under very unfavourable conditions such as extraterritorial rights for the foreigners and low import-export duties. Daimyō and samurai, notably from the Chōshū domain (Yamaguchi) and Satsuma domain (Kagoshima), did not forgive the *Bakufu* for this show of weakness and finally overthrew Tokugawa Yoshinobu. Inspired by the xenophobic *Sonnō Jōi* movement (Revere the Emperor — Repel the barbarians), they formally restored the imperial dynasty, on January 4, 1868, legitimating their *coup d'état*. The Americans who were recovering from their Civil War (1861-1865), and the European nations who were distracted by the Franco-German War (1870) could not pay much attention to, or even less interfere with, the new turn taken by Japan.

The Emperor Meiji, a 15-year old boy, became the new leader of the nation — a symbolic one anyway. He was promptly transferred from Kyoto to the shōgun's castle in Tokyo. On the other hand, the Restoration designers (Appendix 3), former supporters of the *Repel-the-barbarians* policy, were struck by foreign technology which was much superior to theirs. Satsuma and Chōshū had been defeated respectively in 1863 and 1864 by Western naval forces. They therefore decided to change their political philosophy for another set of goals summed up in this new slogan: Enrich the country — Strengthen the military (*Fukoku Kyōhei*). Indeed, they thought that if they were to catch up with, and if possible to outmatch, the Occident, they would modernise the country, not only in creating a modern and strong army able to resist Western imperialism, but also in showing that Japan could become ‘civilised’, and be recognised as an equal.

## ‘CATCHING UP’ AND CONSEQUENCES DURING THE MEIJI ERA (1868-1912)

### New institutions: toward a richer State

First of all it was essential to stabilise finances and centralise the wealth of the country. To manage these issues, the Ministry of Finance (Ōkura-shō) was created as early as in 1869, and the domains (*han*) structure was replaced in 1871 by prefectures (*ken*) directly subordinated to the central government in Tokyo. In the same year, the Postal Savings System was created, to gather household savings, followed by the establishment of the Ministries of Industry (*Kōbushō*) and Education (*Monbushō*). Finally, in 1873, a new land tax, paid in cash, was introduced. On the other hand, lacking funds, the government ended turning state industries over to private businesses which, in return for privileges, agreed to pursue leaders' goals. Industrial and financial business conglomerates (*zaibatsu*), like Mitsui or Mitsubishi, were thus created and gathered momentum (e.g. Jansen 1995: 268-329).

However, the *Unequal Treaties* signed by Tokugawa were a heavy burden on the country's economy. In an attempt to abrogate them, a group composed of 48 Meiji government members led by Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883) visited the United States and several European countries from 1871 to 1873. The mission

failed in its objectives, for the treaties were left untouched, but on his return Iwakura advocated the consolidation of the imperial institution, the writing of a constitution, and the creation of a parliamentary system, in order to demonstrate how enlightened they could become and to gain the respect of the Western powers. Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), one of the mission leaders, was asked to embark on these tasks, and played a major role, notably in the setting up of a Cabinet system in 1885 and, four years later, in the establishment of the Meiji Constitution.

### **Militarisation and expansion: toward a stronger Military**

Another most prominent second-generation Meiji leader was Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922), the political nemesis of Itō. He was sent to Europe in 1869 to study European military systems. Back in Japan, he took on the setting up of a national army, starting with the creation in 1873 of a military conscription system. He modernised the Japanese army based on the Prussian model which had impressed him the most.

On the international stage, faced with Russian and American threats, Japan imitated their Western counterparts in adopting a security-through-expansion strategy. First, in order to set the northern national border, *Ezochi* was renamed as Hokkaido, and it started to be colonised from as early as 1869. Ten years later, the Ryukyu Kingdom, vassal of both the Chinese emperor and of the Shōgun (from 1603), was also annexed to become the Okinawa prefecture. Both experiences taught Japanese leaders how to tackle the subsequent colonization on the continent — deemed necessary since Japan was lacking in natural assets, but above all because, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, possessing colonies was the mark of a ‘civilised’ nation. Secondly, the Meiji oligarchs had to make sure that Korea — geographically very close to Japan — would become independent. They thus decided to wage their first modern war against China, Korea’s century-old suzerain. The First Sino-Japanese War (*Nisshin Sensō* 1894–1895) ended with the Japanese taking over Formosa (Taiwan), and the Korean peninsula being “freed”. In 1897, however, in pursuit of a warm-water port on the Pacific Ocean, Tsarist Russia leased from China the Liaodong Peninsula — with the coveted Port Arthur — and started the construction of a railway through Manchuria. However, these regions ran parallel the whole Korean border and were thus considered by the Japanese to be part of their sphere of influence. Encroachments eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War (*Nichi-Ro Sensō* 1904–1905), won by Japan, which seized the Kwantung Leased Territory, and developed the South Manchurian Railway. Five years later, Korea was annexed.

### **The Japanese Emperor: toward a spirit of *national unity***

Even though a national sentiment had been building up during the Tokugawa Shogunate, the pace of it had to be accelerated and oriented toward modernisation because the Meiji leaders had to consolidate the new centralised State tackling domestic and international unrest. The image of the Meiji Emperor (and the colonies) would become instrumental in this identity construction process.

On the one hand, Itō thought that a magnificent monarch would win international respect, so much the better if progress and civilisation (*Bunmei Kaika*) were associated with his image. In fact, Japanese people’s appetite had been whetted for these ideals by literature written by Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901) — one of the founders of modern Japan. The Meiji Emperor thus had to display two faces: a Westernised face, turned outwards for international purposes — wardrobe and Court etiquette were Westernised —

and a domestic face turned inwards for nationalistic purposes. Tours were organised to ‘show’ him around the country, for the ‘Japanese’ people to become aware of their new figurehead. Whenever possible he traveled aboard a steam train, the symbol of modernisation *par excellence*.

Yamagata was unhappy with these outings. His vision of the Emperor, which eventually prevailed, was one of a divine figure of whom the ‘Japanese’ could feel being the children, they should obey, or give their lives if necessary. In this way, the people would become a nation, if only under the domination of the *genrō* (retired elder statesmen) being in control behind the throne. Under the instigation of Yamagata, two rescripts played a capital role in the transmission of the national ideology. The first one was the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (1882) which stipulated that Japan’s military was answerable only to the Emperor himself, therefore bypassing the government and the legislation. The second one was the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), issued just after the Meiji Constitution promulgation. It put an emphasis on a Confucian-derived loyalty to the Emperor, and requested the people to be ready to sacrifice their lives for the State (Appendix 4). The document had a strong impact on the population because, being distributed to all schools with a portrait of Meiji Emperor, it had to be recited by the children every morning in all elementary school classrooms, or during important school events (e.g. Jansen 2000: 389-411).

## THE TAISHŌ ‘DEMOCRACY’ (1912-1926): END OF THE ‘CATCHING UP’

With the dawn of the Taishō period, the *fukoku-kyōhei* goals of the Meiji oligarchs being reached, the drive to catch up with the ‘West’ was nearing its end. Nevertheless at the same time several factors and ways of thinking which would lead to the Fifteen Year War (1931-1945), including the Pacific War, were taking root.

### The Japanese State: ‘Democratic’ institutions and economic stability

Firstly, the country had acquired democratic features, such as a Cabinet and a Constitution. Some political parties had developed, and elections had been held, even though the franchise was still limited (men over 25, having paid a certain amount of tax). Regarding economics, the *Unequal Treaties* issue had been resolved, and Japan participated in WWI, on the Allied side, which brought about an economic boost through the selling of materials. Industry thrived under the control of the *zaibatsu* which had allowed the rapid growth of the Meiji economy (e.g. Yamamura 1997: 50-115).

However, both city-dwellers and farmers were dissatisfied with the modernisation, which had been building up at a high pace, generating social traumas and anxieties. In fact industrial development caused new issues such as the appearance of a new class of poor — the proletarian. For the sake of industrialisation, Western social and scientific notions had also to be assimilated over a short period of time, and they triggered tremendous changes in the following visions: *the representation of time* because the Gregorian calendar had to be adopted for commercial treaties, and the unvarying regularity of Western hours for modern factories and railways timetables. Also the *representation of space* changed since from a secluded country divided into domains, Japan became an imperialist one with a national frontier including colonies. Finally *the representation of nature* was altered since the physical world had to be apprehended through universal laws (revealed by human reasoning and experimentation) (e.g. Morris-Suzuki 1996:

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71-104).

In my opinion, these new rationalities, imposed in less than fifty years put the Japanese psyche under heavy stress, and rejection was looming. A spokesman of that generation who questioned the movement of change was the great novelist Natsume Sōseki (1867-1916) whose major themes were the traumatic and disruptive nature of modernisation, and the nostalgia for a richer past which was fading away (Napier 1996: 1, 242).

### **The Japanese Military: Two victories, a Western ally, and colonies**

Japan's military victories seemed to confirm that the Japanese appraisal of the international situation was correct. But as a consequence these conquests altered the understanding that the country had regarding its place in the world.

On the one hand, the First Sino-Japanese War victory changed Japan's perception of its position in 'Asia'. Indeed Japan abandoned the Asian model of the world centered on China — in which barbarism increases the farther one moves away from the centre — for another model inspired by the West and in which 'foreignness' is reinterpreted in terms of 'underdevelopment'. In this way, 'modern' Japan could redefine its place at the center of its own local world, instead of China (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 14-34).

Another capital influence on this new vision came from Social-Darwinism, a European racial theory closely studied by Japanese scholars and ideologists. It would lead to the idea that the Japanese nation-state was a united "body" (*kokutai*), endowed with unique historical, cultural and genetic aspects making it 'naturally' better and stronger than neighbouring countries, and justifying in the same way the colonisation and violence imposed on them (Weiner 1994; Thomas 2001: 179-225).

Also the modernised Japanese army astonished the world when it defeated Russia, a 'white' power — with the assistance of Britain which was a Western ally of Japan since 1902. In this way Japan acquired colonies, sources of raw materials (essential to modern industry), and tokens of 'civilisation', as mentioned before (see also Jukes 2002).

I think that these 'easy' victories and gains — particularly from WWI — brought about a sentiment of overconfidence among the military — the specter of Perry seemed far away — and a false sense that colonial expansion was an appropriate response to threat.

### **The Japanese Nation: Unity through the Emperor and the Shinto religion**

The existence of a 'Japanese Nation' is no more in doubt. Education, conscription, and the press all helped to ensure that this was so. Japan's victories, in particular, attributed to bushido and to patriotic willingness to self-sacrifice for the empire, seemed to demonstrate the legitimacy of the oligarchs as representative of the Nation (Anderson 2006: 96-97).

Other policies had been conducted in order to redirect the spiritual sentiments of the Japanese away from their local beliefs, and toward a homogenised belief in a unique *kokutai* based on the mythical divinity of the Emperor. First there was the national enshrinement, at Yasukuni shrine, of the spirits of soldiers who died "for the Emperor". This action channeled the people's religious feelings into a common spiritual focus. Another policy was the *Shrines Merger* (*jinja gappei*), a programme which brought the vast number of local Shinto temples into a pyramidal structure, on top of which stood Yasukuni (Figal 1999: 199-203).

In this way, local religious reverence was redirected toward the Emperor who stood as the spiritual

symbol of the Nation.

## REJECTION OF THE WEST DURING THE SHŌWA ERA (1926-1989)

Among the complex network of factors leading to war and its disastrous consequences, the most related to past Meiji policies and the “catching up” are, in my opinion, the following ones.

### The Meiji Constitution: An open-door for anti-democratic pressure

Inspired by the Prussian Constitution of 1850, the Meiji Constitution began by proclaiming the sanctity and inviolability of the Emperor. In this manner, Meiji oligarchs made sure that democratic institutions could never challenge the monarch as well as the Restoration leaders making decisions for him, sometimes without his knowledge. He had also the power to issue edicts, to appoint Cabinet ministers, and he was the supreme commander of the armed forces. Even laws enacted by the parliament had to receive imperial approval (Oda 2003: 36-43).

With democracy still kept at bay, the Shōwa era saw party cabinets becoming increasingly powerless in the face of domestic violence, and growing interference by the military. The Japanese Parliament (*kokkai*) gradually turned itself into a body supporting the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and eventually the Pacific War.

From an economic point of view, while farmers and shopkeepers were hard hit by the stock market crash of 1929, the *zaibatsu*'s banks used the crisis as an opportunity to make huge profits. Such behaviour reinforced the citizens' view that capitalists were greedy and selfish, and political parties — incidentally still split between Satsuma and Chōshū cliques — were the ‘dogs’ of the economic system (Gordon 2009: 181-185). That situation bore a similarity to the people's discontent in Germany and Italy, but it did not developed into fascism *per se* (Duus and Okimoto 1979).

### The sensitive Manchuria: Legacies from the Meiji military

The military had become autonomous and above the law with the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (1882). Its instigator, Yamagata, died in 1922 and was no more controlling the situation. His military successors exercised their power with less and less restraint and the junior officers became growingly disobedient (*gekokujo*) and aggressive, in particular in Manchuria (Auer 2006: 49, 75).

Inner Manchuria was an important legacy from Japan's first victory against a Western country (Russia). In a way that region was probably ‘hard evidence’ that the military had fulfilled the ‘Strong army’ objective to be found in the Meiji slogan. Indeed the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), triggered by the Marco Polo Bridge incident, may be seen as a continuous attempt to reinforce Manchuria's southern border which was each time extended more into China.

On the other hand, the Western powers opposition to Japan's proposition to insert a clause in the Treaty of Versailles proscribing racial discrimination (1919), and the refusal of Britain to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1921) began to fuel ancient paranoia against old foes. Furthermore, the second London Naval Conference (1930) restrictions on Japanese battleship tonnage, in comparison to Britain and the US, resembled the *Unequal Treaties*.

For these reasons, instead of withdrawing from its Chinese possessions when asked to by the League of

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Nations, after its invasion of northern Manchuria (1931), Japan preferred to cut itself off from the international society (1933). Isolated and probably influenced by their ‘Prussian origins’, the Shōwa military chose Germany as an ally in 1940, making Japan a *de facto* enemy of the Allied forces.

One can muse on the fact that without *Manchukuo*, no *Marco Polo Bridge incident* would have occurred, triggering no Second Sino-Japanese War, leading to no Pacific War.

### **The Nation: Brought up in militarism and in the Emperor system**

The collapse of the economic order starting with the Great Depression in 1929 added an additional burden on the Japanese population already debilitated by the demanding industrial machine — bringing about poverty and distress amongst town workers as well as farmers. The Peace Preservation Law, reinforced in 1928, served the State as a means to control protests, and the ideological orthodoxy of the Emperor system (*tennōsei*) was strengthened in the 1930s (e.g. Gluck 1985: 281). The government also used State Shintō to encourage patriotism, and to foster the belief that supporting the war was a sacred duty. Japan’s ‘divine’ mission was to liberate Asia from the Western powers and to unify Asian countries under its ‘benevolent’ rule.

The majority of people may therefore have considered the military as the solution to domestic violence and economic recession. They supported the war effort, some passively, and others enthusiastically, in the name of the Emperor, in the hope of a knock-on effect on the economy, or because they were left with no choice but to go to the battlefields.

## **CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, Westernisation contributed to Japan becoming a centralised State, with democratic trappings, tightly related to the *zaibatsu*. Besides, heavy industry had been diverted and expanded for the military needs. In 1945, the country was thus equipped with dense railway and telegraph networks, and soon would be endowed with a well developed merchant marine. This infrastructure became a major asset for postwar Japan, contributing to the later high growth era. Today, the Meiji *fukoku* goal seems to have been reached, even though relations between the State and the economy remain close, and often ignore the citizens’ needs (e.g. van Wolferen 1987: 25-49).

Westernisation also contributed to Japan becoming a militarist and imperialist State, with the most modern and powerful military force in Asia. But following the defeat, the army and navy were disbanded, and favourable rescripts abolished. Today, the Meiji *kyōhei* goal is therefore out of reach, even though the Japanese Self-Defense Forces comes second to the American army in terms of development and technology. Periodically, debates are in the news about transforming it into a ‘normal’ army, or about the postwar Constitution Ninth Article revision, deemed necessary to free the SDF actions on the international stage.

Moreover, waging wars and possessing colonies brought about tremendous changes, and also caused painful wounds that are still open today. Hokkaido and Okinawa were the first to be annexed to delimitate the national territory, and to serve as the ‘Backward Other’ against which Japan could create its own identity as a modern country. To date, both are still ‘outlying’ prefectures, with pending problems such as

the Ainu people, or the American bases issues. Later, colonies in Asia and Social-Darwinism led Japan to feel ‘separate’ from, and better than, its Asian neighbours. Would this explain the ferocity of its security-through-expansion wars? The Japanese occupation has left many unpleasant memories of atrocities such as the Nanjing massacre, or the exploitation of ‘comfort women’ or Korean workers. On the other hand, problems of borders are still impeding normal diplomacy with Russia (Northern Territories dispute), and fueling frictions with Korea and China. One can also think that Japan’s military actions changed the course of world history in playing a role in revolutions as in Ming China, and Tsarist Russia, as well as in the process of Western decolonisation of Asia.

Finally, Westernisation contributed to the creation of a Nation or the feeling of being ‘Japanese’, an ambiguous term mixing cultural and racial features (*minzoku*). Today, most people live in cities, but they long for countryside. They are believers in progress and modernity, but they seem to lend importance to traditions. These apparent contradictions probably find their roots in the nation-building process launched by the Meiji leaders. To build high levels of productivity, they had to dissolve class distinctions and domains, and replace the lost traditional ties with invented traditions (Vlastos 1998). With this aim in view, Mutsuhito will be transformed into a Janus-like Emperor: one facet being a divine descendant of Goddess *Amaterasu*, of whom all ‘Japanese’ are the children; the other facet being a symbol of modernisation to which they should all contribute. Identification with the emperor might therefore have created a phenomenon of ‘double-personality’ in the Japanese psyche, where Westernisation, hidden in modernity, and Japanisation are in constant opposition.

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## Appendixes

### Appendix 1. Chronological Table of Japan's History from 1868 to 1945

Year	Era	Event
1868	MEIJI	Restoration of the emperor
1869	Mutsuhito (1868-1912)	Creation of the Ministry of Finance; Start of Hokkaido ( <i>Ezochi</i> ) colonisation; First telegraphic line (Tokyo-Yokohama)
1870		Ministry of Industry creation; First measures to institute Shinto as the State religion; First Criminal Code (Shinritsu-kōryō)
1871		Postal savings system created; Creation of the yen; <i>Domains</i> replaced by <i>Prefectures</i> ; Confucian class distinctions abolished; creation of the Ministry of Education; Iwakura mission leaving for USA and Europe
1872		First railway line completed (Tokyo-Yokohama); Compulsory elementary education; First ordinance on Education ( <i>Gakusei</i> ) Army and Navy Ministries establishment; Gregorian Calendar
1873		New land tax system; Military conscription; Iwakura mission back to Japan; Home Office established; First national bank
1877		Most violent uprising of samurai against Meiji government (led by Saigō Takamori); Tokyo University creation
1879		Ryukyu Islands become Okinawa Prefecture
1880		New Education Reform (Kyōikurei)
1881		Creation of the Ministries of Commerce, and Agriculture
1882		Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors; Bank of Japan creation
1885		Cabinet system adopted; Datsua Nyūō (Fukuzawa Yukiichi)
1886		Adoption of the Metric System
1888		The Privy Council established; negotiation to revise the <i>Unequal Treaties</i>
1889		Constitution promulgated; Mitsubishi emerging
1890		First general elections; Imperial Rescript on Education ( <i>kyōiku Chokugo</i> ) issued; First penal Code
1893		Law on Publication (strict censorship)

Year	Era	Event
1894		Treaty revision agreed upon between Japan and England
1894-1895		First Sino-Japanese War
1895		Annexation of Formosa (Taiwan)
1898		New Civil Code
1900		Only active military access to Ministry of War; Law of lese-majesty
1902		Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded; literacy level: 90%
1903		Direct control of the Education Ministry over school textbooks
1904-1905		Russo-Japanese War
1909		Law of censorship against socialism
1910		Annexation of Korea; sharing the Manchuria occupation with Russia
1911		Back to custom freedom with the USA; Renewal of the Alliance with Britain
1912		Death of Emperor Meiji
1914	TAISHO Yoshihito (1912-1926)	Japan participation in WWI (declare war on Germany)
1916		Special rights in Manchuria; Economic boom
1917		Creation of the Riken (Research Center in Physics and Chemistry)
1919		Treaty of Versailles (peace treaty at the end of WWI)
1921		No renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
1922		Forced to give back Chinese territories; Washington Conference on naval arms limitation
1923		The Great Kantō earthquake (Tokyo)
1924		Immigration Act (immigration of Japanese to the USA forbidden)
1925		Creation of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Universal manhood suffrage enacted; Peace Preservation Law
1926		Death of Emperor Taisho
1928	SHOWA Hirohito (1926-1989)	Tensions in Manchuria; Peace Preservation Law strengthened
1929		Wall Street crash
1931		The Manchurian Incident (Fifteen Years War begins); Outer Manchuria is invaded
1932		Manchuria is renamed Manchukuo, Pu Yi as executive head (puppet state); Party government ends in Japan
1933		Withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations
1934		Withdrawal of Japan from the Washington Conference
1935		Reaffirmation of the infallibility of the Emperor; Industrial production exceeds agricultural
1936		Prominent leaders assassinated by radical militarists
1937		'The Cardinal Principles of the National Polity ( <i>Kokutai no hongi</i> )' promulgated by Education Ministry; Marco-Polo Bridge incident; Start of Second Sino-Japanese War; Nanjing massacre
1938		General Mobilization Law; Reinforcement of the law on the Press
1940		Japan's troops move into French Indochina; Alliance with Germany and Italy; Dissolution of all parties
1941		American embargo; Japan attacks US (Pearl Harbor); Start of the Pacific War

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Year	Era	Event
1945		Atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Japan surrenders

(Sources: Hane 2001; Sabouret 2005; Hamajima Shoten 2006; Margolin 2007)

**Appendix 2. The Unequal Treaties**

Treaty name	Year	Imposer
Convention of Kanagawa	1854	United States
Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty	1854	United Kingdom
Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Harris Treaty)	1858	United States
Ansei Treaties	1858	United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Netherlands, France
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce	1858	United Kingdom

(Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unequal\\_Treaties](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unequal_Treaties) [4 October 2008])**Appendix 3. The “three great nobles” (*Ishin no Sanketsu*) and the “founding fathers” of modern Japan (*Genrō — Privy Council*)**

Name	Origin	Life	Role
Kido Takayoshi	Chōshū	1833 — 1877	In Five Charter Oath, in abolishing the han system; in the education of Emperor Meiji.
Saigō Takamori	Satsuma	1827 — 1877	As military leader; Satsuma Rebellion leader
Ōkubo Toshimichi	Satsuma	1830 — 1878	In Land Tax Reform, in ending official discrimination against the outcasts, as Home Minister, in promoting industry

(Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three\\_great\\_nobles](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_great_nobles) [9 November 2008])

Name	Origin	Life	Post
Itō Hirobumi	Chōshū	1841 — 1909	Four times Prime Minister
Kuroda Kiyotaka	Satsuma	1840 — 1900	Once PM
Ōyama Iwao	Satsuma	1842 — 1916	Field marshal
Inoue Kaoru	Chōshū	1836 — 1915	Vice Minister of Finance in 1871; Foreign Affairs in 1885; Agriculture and Commerce; Home Minister; Finance
Saigō Tsugumichi	Satsuma	1843 — 1902	Navy Minister; Internal Affairs.
Matsukata Masayoshi	Satsuma	1835 — 1924	Home Minister in 1880; Twice PM
Yamagata Aritomo	Chōshū	1838 — 1922	Field marshal; Twice PM
Katsura Tarō	Chōshū	1848 — 1913	Minister of War; three times PM
Saionji Kinmochi	Aristocrat	1849 — 1940	Minister of Education; Twice PM

(Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genro> [9 November 2008])**Appendix 4. The Imperial Rescript on Education**

Know ye, Our subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors founded our empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly planted virtue; Our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have, from generation to generation,

illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Nation, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate the arts and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the state; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our imperial throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by our imperial ancestors, to be observed alike by their descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, our subjects, that we all thus attain to the same virtue.

*The 30<sup>th</sup> day of the 10<sup>th</sup> month of the 23<sup>rd</sup> year of Meiji (1890)*

(Source: Theodore de Bary 2006: 108-109)

(2009年7月3日掲載決定)