THE DOUBLE TRUTH

IN

PARMENIDES AND NAGARJUNA

Hideya YAMAKAWA

ABSTRACT

The 'ἀλήθεια' was, for Parmenides, nothing other than the very thing, which he discovered and gave it a name 'τὸ ἐόν' for the first time. The denomination of a novel concept like that of 'τὸ ἐόν' inevitably forces one to grapple with a traditional system of language, under which he is inevitably restricted and which comprises everything that is already known.

The language necessarily presupposes a whole of conventional things that has been traditionally established by social consensus or surroundings[1]. It is an original field where the so-called *Urdoxa* casts its anchor[2]. The words of a language are fully charged with various preconceptions imposed by collective usage, which may conceal and pervert the real state of things. In order to reveal the real state of things, one must *uncover* the veil of concealed facts.

Thus, the act of ἀληθεύειν necessarily has to be a kind of *apo-calypsis* which could be expressed by a series of negative terms such as 'un-dressing,' 'un-covering,' 'un-veiling,' and so on. Seen from such a viewpoint, the Parmenidean Way of Truth might be viewed as nothing other than *the way of methodological negation*[3] by which the naked and patent reality could be disclosed.

About 2500 years ago, Parmenides, an Western philosopher, went along this way to ἀλήθεια, and came back again to the native land of mortals in order to tell them the truth of τὸ ἐόν in human language; namely the so-called *Doxa*-language.

By the way, contrasting with Parmenides' case, it is very interesting that, in the second and third centuries A. D., Nagarjuna, another philosopher in the East, followed a very similar way of negation. He too preached to people on the doctrine of two truths, namely truth relating to worldly convention on the one hand and truth in terms of ultimate fruit on the other hand.

Both philosophers' motives and ways of thinking are so strikingly similar one another that their theories of truth, which are originally based on a kind of divine revelation or religious experience, will be worthy of comparison.

Parmenides' fragment Bl, 28-32 run as follows:

.....................χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσται
ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐκυκέος ἀτρεμές ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.
ἀλλ᾽ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.

The cited locus is one of the most controversial passages in Parmenides' fragments. Leaving aside the details of my reading of the line 30 τῆς, and the line 32 περῶντα[4], The pivotal points consist in "...χρῆν εἶναι"; especially in 'τὰ δοκοῦντα' and 'δοκίμως.' I present here my view in its essential points.

Having regard to the achievements in the past[5], I think, it is preferable that 'δοκίμως' is to be taken as meaning 'acceptably[6].' In that case 'τὰ δοκοῦντα' have to naturally refer to some objective things opined true by mortals, whereas from Goddess' viewpoint they are regarded as something like bricks with which 'κόσμον...ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν' (fr.8.52) is constructed. Namely, I assume that Parmenides in this locus is notifying the entrance of 'μορφὰς...δύο' in fr.8.53 and 'φάος καὶ νύξ' in fr.9.1 beforehand. The assumption will make "two forms" more neatly fit in the phrase "διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα," since 'once all things have been named Light and Night,' all things were filled equally with both of them at the same time, so that 'there is nothing which does not belong to either' (fr.9). Such being the case, finally, 'εἶναι' the complementary infinitive of 'χρῆν' modified by 'δοκίμως' (adverb) conveys some existential sense. Thus, the above quoted lines can be translated as follows:

"You should learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth as the opinions of mortals in which there is no true belief. Nevertheless you shall learn these things too, how it was necessary that the objects opined true by mortals, which per-

vade all things through all things, had to *be* acceptably."

Thus, there is no doubt that Parmenides the Eleatic philosopher, drawing a clear line between 'ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ' and 'βροτῶν δόξας' on the one hand, notifies beforehand the condition under which the latter should obtain a kind of acceptability or reliability on the other hand; to put it tersely, a kind of human truth endorsed by the divine truth of the real[7].

The fact may give a considerable weight to scholars who somehow concede that ἀλήθεια and δόξα are two sides of the same reality and who read the last part of Fr.8.38 as 'τῷ πάντ' ὀνόμασται' (the reading E). Of course, there can be various counter-arguments on this reading, including the view that the verb ὀνομάζεσθαι in Parmenides has a double nominative so that it cannot be connected with a dative[8].

Nevertheless, I think that "τῷ" here must refer to "τὸ ἐόν in some way[9]." For it is indisputable that Parmenides gave his approval to the case that the legitimate naming had to always obtain in relation to their genuine referent. The so-called "empty (or "mere") name" is so called because of its insulated relation to the genuine referent. In order to be charged with meaningfulness, the "empty" name in question has to recover its proper circuit in relation to "τὸ ἐόν[10]." Thus, the route connecting ἀλήθεια and δόξα still remains.

If the above mentioned is proper, the route in question is probably a circular one. This conjecture will be strengthened, if we place the solitary fragment 5 (ξυνὸν δὲ μοί ἐστὶν, ὁππόθεν ἄρξωμαι τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἵξωμαι αὖθις.) before fragment 2. As far as its subject matter is methodological, the fragment 5 has an affinity with fr.2 or fr.8, but not with the so-called Doxa part itself. On the other hand, the fragment expresses a kind of circular movement, which does not fit into the patterns of axiomatic or deductive arguments in fr.2 or fr.8. Moreover, the meshes of fr.5 are too large to pick up the items involved in fr.8.

Thus appealing to the elimination by substitution, I come to a conclusion that fr.5 refers to the two terms and in the context of the fragment 1.29-30. If this is acceptable, we may assume that the Goddess in fragment 5 speaks as follows: 'it is the same to me from which between I begin to tell you, since to that point from which I start I shall come back again.' Namely, according to this interpretation it follows that there are two ways connecting ἀλήθεια and δόξα: one is the way of negation (the so-called Way of Truth) and the other is the way of multiplication or linguistic proliferation (the so-called

Way of Doxa), and they are reciprocatively united in the framework of Parmenides' onto-methodological thinking.

The last word may need an explanation bearing on the Parmenidean logic. On the nature of Parmenidean logic in the context of the Way of Truth, the so-called "standard Anglo-American interpretation of Parmenides[11]" has so far produced many different variations. For an example, I pick up one, which is my Revised Version[12] of F. J. Pelletier's[13]. According to this version, Parmenidean way of Negation is accomplished as follows:

I. Either every statement itself is meaningful or its negation is meaningful, but not both.
II. The meaning of statement is the case referred to by the statement at issue.
III. What is the case can be referred to only when it obtains.

For example, the sentence "Parmenides is not flying" is, by I, either meaningful or meaningless. If Parmenides is not flying, it is not the case that Parmenides is flying. Hence, by III, the case cannot be referred to. Therefore also, by II, the sentence "Parmenides is not flying" is meaningless.

Repeating this procedure likewise, the Parmenideans could sweep away in a moment not only the statements of non-existent things but also the statements of (apparently) existent things, all of which the public firmly believes to be real. As the result of this, in the end, they will realize that 'μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν).' (fr.8.1-2) Thus, the way may be called "the way of negation."

Now, let me go to the way of multiplication or linguistic proliferation. The pivotal locus disclosing the mechanism of multiplication (fr.8.55-58) is the following: 'ἀντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, …ἑωυτῷ πάντοσε τωυτόν, τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ μὴ τωυτόν (they divided form contradistinctively and set them marks apart from one another).' The phrase discloses the identity of principles by which mortals con-structed the world. The division had to be completed *simultaneously*; whereas once being divided they had to be *here* and *there* topologically and *succeed* one another in *front* and in *rear* in a time series[14]. Where Light (day) *is* now, Night *is not* there. Note that this "now" is radically different from that "now" in fr.8.5. The "now" in fr.8.5 is the absolute "now" (νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν, συνεχές; fr.8.5-6) standing comparison with ὡς ἔστιν. Thus, mortal's principles are based on the bridgeless contradiction, the connec-tion of *being* and *not-being*.

By the way, it is notable that the starting-point of linguistic proliferation consists in the very connection of *being* and *not-being*. Our thinking inevitably presupposes a dichotomy between affirmation and negation, active and passive, agent and action, one and many, and so on. Even a single sentence presupposes at least two terms. For example, the sentence 'Zeno is tall' requires the two terms of "Zeno" and "tall". In addition, "Zeno" also presupposes "not-Zeno", and likewise "tall" "not-tall". Without connection of being and not-being there cannot be any linguistic activity.

Let me observe further some peculiarities of mortals' principles. They are 'everywhere identical with itself but not identical with other.' We can liken them to the positive and negative poles between which an electric current flows. They are in a complementary relation one another, so that they are also in a reciprocatively dependent relation one another. Thus, (1) Light (Φ) is a complement of its counterpart Night (**N**), and conversely (2) Night (**N**) is also a complement of its counterpart Light (Φ), so that (3) the sum of them ($\Phi \cup$ **N**) represents an universe of discourse. Then, we can translate the Goddess' utterance as follows:

1. Φ is the same as Φ, and, Φ is not the same as Non-Φ.

Can we decide the truth-value of this sentence? It seems to be clear that the left side factor

2. Φ is the same as Φ

is acceptable to both Goddess and mortals; its acceptability to mortals is self-evident; and it is true for Goddess too, since 2 does not refer to not-being and the statement 'Φ is the same as Φ' is reduced to 'it is the case that Φ *is*.' Note that 'Φ *is*' is universally true in the domain of discourse where there is no other than Φ. However, the Goddess will flatly reject the right side factor

3. Φ is not the same as Non-Φ,

since 3 involves 'Non-Φ which refers to not-being.

However, we, mortals will be much embarrassed by the fact, since 3 is a tautology and is equivalent to the above 2 which will be sanctioned by the Goddess. Therefore,

anyone who is mortal should press the Goddess with a question: 'why do you not accept a tautological truth such as "Φ is the same as Φ," and, "Φ is not the same as Non-Φ"?' The Goddess' reply might be as follows:

'Oh *Koure* (see fr.1.24), I do not reject your opinion simply, but I am prepared to concede your point, provided that you could gaze upon those absent things with your mind as present steadfastly so that you will never cut off being from holding fast to being (see fr.4). For, Light and Night, to which the wandering δίκρανοι (see fr.6.5) stack, really were not to be 'two' but one. For this reason, the conjunction between them had to refer to the only one ultimate truth: 'ἔστιν'. Keep this truth in your mind firmly, then the whole order of things (διάκοσμος) based on it will become a probable one (ἐοικότα) among all (πάντα), so that any mortal never shall outstrip you in so far as your knowledge is concerned (see fr.8.59-61). Now, you are an enlightened man (see fr.1.3). You must come back again to your homeland, since there live those men, who naively believe that 'everything were born and now are and they will afterwards grow and perish.' (See fr.19) Because of this, they are in need of enlightenment. Your message of truth, not of ultimate truth itself, but of truth in human language, has to be conveyed.'

It is significant that a parallel case with Promenades happened in India. Nagarjuna the Mahayana Buddhist (150-250 A. D.) declared in his *Mulamadhymakarika* (XXIV) as follows[15]:

> The teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two truths:
> Truth relating to worldly convention and truth in terms of ultimate fruit. (XXIV.8)
> Those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths
> Do not understand the profound truth embranoiodied in the Buddha's message.
>   (XXIV.9)
> Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught.
> Without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained. (XXIV.10)

Nagarjuna's doctrine of two truths originates in the Gautama Buddha who was an eastern contemporary of Parmenides. Nagarjuna begins his *Mulamadhymakarika* (here-

after: *Karika*) with the verse of salutation to Gautama Buddha:

> I salute him, the fully enlightened, the best of speakers, who preached the non-ceasing and the non-arising, the non-annihilation and the non-permanence, the non-identity and the non-difference, the non-appearance and the non-disappearance, the dependent arising, the quiescent of linguistic proliferation, the auspicious.

The heart to be grasped consists in the words 'the dependent arising (*pratityasamut-pada*), the quiescent of linguistic proliferation (*prapancopasama*).' The original idea goes back to the Buddha-words in *Kaccayanagotta-sutta*. The Buddha in *Kaccayanagotta-sutta* preached to Kaccayana, who asked him 'what is a right view,' the necessity of middle way avoiding two extremes between "is" and "is not", and showed the doctrine of dependent-arising (*pratityasamutpada*)[16].

The dependent arising has two aspects, which are inseparably connected: *pravrtti* (activity) and *nivrtti* (cessation). The former is also *prapanca* (linguistic proliferation) by which arises the entire mass of sufferings in the profane world. The latter is the negation of *prapanca*, by which the ceasing of entire mass of sufferings will be attained.

It is significant to note that Nagarjuna identifies "the quiescent of linguistic proliferation" with "emptiness" (*sunyata*). He says, 'The linguistic proliferation is extinguished in emptiness (*sunyata*).' (XVIII.5)

What is then the "*sunyata*"? A brief historical survey is necessary[17]. Between the first century B. C. and first century A. D., the concept of "emptiness" (*sunyata*) made its grand appearance in the contexts of the early Mahayana scriptures such as *Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita* and *Saddharmapundarika-sutra*. In revolt against Abhidharma Buddhists who sought to define the world as having own-nature, the Early Mahayana Buddhists of Prajnaparamita, who aimed at the spiritual salvation of lay believers, were bold enough to nullify the entire world under the slogan of "form is emptiness" (*rupam sunyata*), where "*rupa*" is a generic name of the physical and mental constituent elements, perception, conception, volition and so on.

In the second and third centuries A. D., when Nagarjuna was active, the orthodox Brahmanic schools also were making efforts to formulate their respective systems of thought. The Samkhya, Nyaya and Vaisesika described the world from their realistic standpoints. According to the Vaisesika school, the world has a multistoried structure composed of six (or seven in later times) categories which are themselves imperishable.

In addition, the Buddhist school such as Sarvastivadin too held a similar world-view to that of the Vaisesikans.

Nagarjuna leveled severe criticism at their views. He maintained that it was wrong to describe the structure of the world. No world with a describable structure was, according to him, real. Its essence is emptiness (*sunyata*) and only a product of the linguistic proliferation (*prapanca*). Thus, Nagarjuna's main aim in the *Karika* was an exhaustive negation of *prapanca*. His main work *Mulamadhymakarika* consists of approximately 450 verses and is divided into 27 chapters which represents nothing other than the nullification of linguistic proliferation: the nullification of verbal expression, concepts or ideas, acts of expression, referents of verbal expression, and the very structure incorporating all the above elements, namely the entire world.

His logical skill is worth seeing, because of its striking likeness to Parmenidean or Zenonean argumentation. For the simplest case, I take up just a part of Chapter II entitled 'An examination of the traversed and the non-traversed'. Chapter II.1 runs as follows[18]:

'That which has been traversed is not being traversed, nor is that which has not been traversed being traversed. That which is being traversed other than that which has been traversed and that which has not been traversed is not being traversed.'

Imagine an arrow (let it be α) which is flying from point A to B. Assume that a point, where the arrow is now, be C. Let the line AC be 'that which has been traversed' and CB be 'that which has not been traversed,' then this verse may be legitimately translated as follows:

(1) AC is not being traversed by α, because AC has already been traversed.
(2) CB is not being traversed by α, because CB has not yet been traversed.
(3) C is not being traversed by α, because the sum of AC and CB represents the sum total of that which is to be traversed.
(4) Therefore, the flying arrow α is not flying.

The argument should remind us immediately Parmenides' refutation of "growth" in fragment 8: 'How and whence grown? I shall not let you say and conceive, from not-being.' (fr.8.7-8) The patterns of argumentation by both philosophers are strikingly similar[19].

However, considering the implication of the above (3), I think, Nagarjuna's skill is more aptly compared to Zeno's one. Zeno's fragment 4 runs as follows: 'what moves does not move either in the place in which it is or in the place in which it is not.' The similarity becomes patent, if the above mentioned "α", "AC", "CB", and "C" are substituted for Zeno's context: 'α does not move either in C, or, in AC and CB[20].'

Thus Nagarjuna gave a logical exposition of the slogan "form is empty" advocated by early Prajnaparamita scriptures, and provided early Mahayana Buddhism with a theoretical model.

However, someone may ask: 'was Nagarjuna a nihilist?' Really, there were some Buddhist metaphysicians who reproached him as follows: 'if all this is empty, then there exists no uprising and ceasing. These imply the non-existence of the four noble truths.' Against this, Nagarjuna replied: 'you do not understand the purpose of emptiness (*sunyataya prayojana*). As such, you are tormented by emptiness (*sunyata*) and the meaning of emptiness (*sunyatartha*)' (XXIV.7).

Nagarjuna suggests here three aspects of emptiness: (1) the emptiness as negation of linguistic proliferation, (2) the emptiness as ultimate truth, and (3) the emptiness actualized in our profane world. He says that these aspects of emptiness should be understood correctly and further ads: 'whatever is the extremity of freedom (*nirvana*) is the extremity of the life-process (*samsarana*);' and further 'between them even a subtle gap does not exist.' (XXV.20)

We could schematize the linkage between these aspects as follows[21]:

The meaning of this diagram can be roughly explained as follows:
(1) The profane world (*samvrti*): this is the world of appearance, which is multiplied by

the linguistic proliferation and the world of "the entire mass of suffering," wherein we live and naively believe the reality of things.

(2) The ultimate truth or dependent arising (*paramarthatya*): this is the extremity that is attained through (a) the way of *nivrtti* or by the emptiness (*sunyata*). The "*nivrtti*" means etymologically "withdrawal from a certain thing." The way of *nivrtti* means an exhaustive withdrawal from *samvrti* and the cessation of all activities in the profane world. Thus, the solidity of world as well as the substantiality of self is puffed out completely by the ultimate truth and the *nirvana* is attained.

(3) The freedom (*nirvana*): This is the extremity of enlightenment attained by *paramarthatya*. The language cannot express this extremity.

(4) The conventional truth (*samvrtisatya*): Nagarjuna calls this "provisional designation" (*prajnaptir upadaya*) and identifies with "the middle way" (*madyama*). (XXIV.18b) The "provisional designation" means the verbalized form of ultimate truth. Therefore, the conventional truth is no other than ultimate truth in verbalized form. It shows ultimate truth projected to the profane dimension. In other words, it is no other than the *nirvana* realized through (b) the way of *pravrtti*.

The two reciprocative vectors of *nivrtti* and *pravrtti* are so tightly united into a circular way that those two truths and two worlds become two facets of just the same reality. Thus, the circle of *pratityasamutpada* was brought to its completion.

Two philosophers in West and East went along *the way of methodological negation* to the ultimate truth and came back again to their fellowmen's native land in order to tell them the truth in human language.

They preached to people on the doctrine of dual truth, namely the doctrine of two truths, which respectively relate to worldly convention and ultimate vision of the reality. Thus telling the dual truth, they never divorced themselves from the conventional world; on the contrary, they announced a fundamental guiding principle, which connects the conventional world-view to what is real. By virtue of their own original methods of argument, they pointed to a path negating the conventional world-view and led to ultimate truth. In addition to this, they also showed a way founding conventional views on ultimate truth. Once ultimate truth is attained, the conventional becomes something to be sanctioned as a kind of truth.

Two philosophers in West and East recovered a port of truth, whereto one should finally make a homeward voyage.

Notes

1) See J. O. Gasset, *The Origin of Philosophy*, W. W. Norton & Company INC. New York, 1967., pp. 60-1: 'Language is precisely something not created by the individual but something that is found by him, previously established by his social environs, his tribe, *polis*, city, or nation.'

2) Here I give my mind the Husserlian conception of "Lebenswelt" as a basic and universal belief of one's particular experiences. Cf. E. Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, 32.

3) Cf. B2.2: δίζησις. Note that Parmenidean δίζησις is a methodological one: 'αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιος εἰσι νοῆσαι.'

4) For my reading of the line 30 τῆς instead of ταῖς, see D. Sider, 'Textual notes on Parmenides' poem'. *Hermes*, 113: 362-6, 1985; for a recent defense of the line 32 περῶντα instead of περ ὄντα, see J. Mansfeld's critical review of P. Thanassas' reading in *Phronesis*, Vol. XLV, No. 4, 2000.

5) P. A. Meijer, *Parmenides beyond the Gates, The Divine Revelation on Being, Thinking and Doxa*, Gieben, Amsterdam, 1997 gives a recent and skillful survey of the scholarly views on 'τὰ δοκοῦντα' and 'δοκίμως.'

6) In this respect, I accept Tarán's interpretation: 'Certainly "acceptable," "trustworthy," "approved," seem to be more likely meanings for δοκίμως.' 'This is what the goddess means when she tells Parmenides that he shall learn how the appearances came to be regarded as real by mortals.' See *Parmenides*, pp. 212-213 and n. 27.

7) In other words, Parmenides in this locus notifies beforehand the conditions under which mortal's confused orientation to the all was to be restored as a truthful one.

8) See P. A. Meijer, *Parmenides beyond the Gates*, p. 176.

9) Considering the context of Parmenides' argument here, obviously it cannot mean "therefore" or "on this account" in an absolute sense of this being testified at b8. 25. Depending on Plato's *Theaetetus* 180d7-e1 John Palmer took it as the dative form of the article with the dative παντί (for the all) *Plato's Reception of Parmenides*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 208-210, albeit it is the case that by "the all" Palmer understands Parmenides' Being.

10) One should here refer to fr.8. 35-36 provided taking line 35 ἐφ' ᾧ instead of ἐν ᾧ.

11) Mourelatos, 'Some alternatives in interpreting Parmenides', *The Monist*, 62, 1979, pp. 3-14.

12) H. Yamakawa, *Kodai Girisia no Sisô* (Ancient Greek Thought), Kodansha, Tokyo, 1993, p. 169.

13) F. J. Pelletier, *Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being*, The University of Chicago Press, 1990.

14) Concerning the identity of mechanism with which the linguistic proliferation proceeds one should remember that doing of *esprit* characterizing modern scientific view of nature which H. Bergson in *Essai* severely criticized; see Essai sur les donnés imméates de la concience, PUF, 1927, pp. 84-85.

15) In my citing from Nagarjuna's *Mulamadhymakarika* in English I consulted mainly David Kalupahana, *Mulamadhymakarika of Nagarjuna*, The Philosophy of the Middle Way, Introduction, Sanskrit Text, English Translation and Annotation, Motilal Banarsidass Piblishers, Private Limited, Delhi, 1991, 1996. However, I consulted also me following books:

Ramendranath Ohose, *The Dialectics of Nagarjuna*, Vohra Publishers & Distributors, Allahbad, India, 1987.

Gajin Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint of Madhyamaka Philosophy*, translated by J. Keenan, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989.

Ram Chandra Pandeya and Manjn, *Nagarjuna's Philosophy of No-Identity*, With philosophical Translations of the Madhyamaka-karika, Sunyata-saptati and Vigrakavyartani, Eastern Book Linkers, Delhi, 1991.

Jay L. Garfield, *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way*, Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakarika, Translation and Commentary, Oxford University Press, 1995.

16) The Buddha's famous discourse to Kaccayana reported by Ananda begins as follows (for the translation of *Kaccayanagotta-Sutta* see Kalupahana pp. 10-11)：'Thus have I heard: The Blessed one was once living at Savatthi, in the monastery of Anathapindika, in Jeta's Grove. At that time the venerable Kaccayana of that clan came to visit him, and saluting him, sat down at one side. So seated, he questioned the Exalted one: "Sir [people] speak of 'right view, right view.' To what extent is there a right view?" "This world, Kaccayana, is generally inclined towards two [views]: existence and non-existence. To him who perceives with right wisdom the uprising of the world as it has come to be, the notion of non-existence in the world does not occur. Kaccayana, to him who perceives with right wisdom the ceasing of the world as it has come to be, the notion of existence in the world does not occur. The world, for the most part, Kaccayana, is bound by approach, grasping and inclination. And he who does not follow that approach and grasping, that determination of mind, that inclination and disposition, who does not cling to or adhere to a view: "This is my self," who thinks: "suffering that is subject to arising arises; suffering that is subject to ceasing, ceases," such a person does not doubt, is not perplexed; Herein, his knowledge is not other-dependent. Thus far, Kaccayana, there is "right view." "Everything exists," — this, Kaccayana, is one extreme. "Everything does not exist," — this, Kaccayana, is the second extreme.'

17) Among many good introductions to the history of formation of the early Mahayana Buddhism and the concept of *sunyata* I recommend here Musashi Tachikawa's description of it in his *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nagarjuna*, translated by Rolf W. Giebel, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Private Limited, Delhi, 1997, which is a revised version of his Japanese book entitled *Ku no Kozo* (The Structure of Emptiness), Daisan Bunmeisha, 1986. My brief sketch mainly follows Tachikawa's description.

18) Here I follow Tachikawa's translation; See p. 54.

19) For the details of Parmenidean negation of growth, see my article 'Reductio ad absurdum, On the Origin of Indirect Proof' in my book *Greek philosophy and the Modern World*, Studies in Greek Philosophy Series, The International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1998, pp. 60-61.

20) For the detailed explanation of Zeno's refutation against motion, see my book *Zenon, Yottsuno Gyakuri (Zeno, Four Paradoxes of Motion)*, Kodan-sha, 1996.

21) Mituyoshi Saigusa in his 'Shoki Daijo no Ninshikiron (Epistemology of the Early Mahayana Buddhism)', *Koza Bukkyo-Shiso*, Vol. 2, 1974 showed the following schema:

samvrti→samvrtisatya→paramarthatya→nirvana→samvrti.

However, his interpretation seems to be contradictory to Nagarjuna's words. According to Nagarjuna, *samvrtisatya* is *prajnaptir upadaya* (provisional designation = the verbalized form of ultimate truth) which is identified with "the middle way" (*madyama*) (XXIV.18b). Presenting the above diagram, I deferred to Tachikawa's interpretation.

Selected Bibliography

Bergson, H., *Essai sur les donnés imméates de la concience*, PUF, 1927.

Chose, Ramendranath., *The Dialectics of Nagarjuna*, Vohra Publishers & Distributors, Allahbad, India, 1987.

Garfield, Jay L., *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way*, Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakarika, Translation and Commentary, Oxford University Press, 1995.

Gasset, J. O., *The Origin of Philosophy*, W. W. Norton & Company INC. New York, 1967.

Husserl, E., *Erfahrung und Urteil*, 32.

Kalupahana, David., *Mulamadhymakarika of Nagarjuna*, The Philosophy of the Middle Way, Introduction, Sanskrit Text, English Translation and Annotation, Motilal Banarsidass Piblishers, Private Limited, Delhi, 1991, 1996.

Mansfeld, J., Review of P. Thanassas' reading in *Phronesis*, Vol. XLV, No. 4, 2000.

Meijer, P. A., *Parmenides beyond the Gates, The Divine Revelation on Being, Thinking and Doxa*, Gieben, Amsterdam, 1997.

Mourelatos, A. P. D., 'Some alternatives in interpreting Parmenides', *The Monist*, 62, 1979.

Nagao, Gajin., *The Foundational Standpoint of Madhyamaka Philosophy*, translated by J. Keenan, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989.

Palmer, John., *Plato's Reception of Parmenides*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999.

Pandeya and Manjn, *Nagarjuna's Philosophy of No-Identity*, With philosophical Translations of the Madhyamaka-karika, Sunyata-saptati and Vigrakavyartani, Eastern Book Linkers, Delhi, 1991.

Pelletier, F. J., *Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being*, The University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Saigusa Mituyoshi., 'Shoki Daijo no Ninshikiron (Epistemology of the Early Mahayana Buddhism)', *Koza Bukkyo-Shiso*, Vol. 2, 1974.

Sider, D., 'Textual notes on Parmenides' poem'. *Hermes*, 113: 362-6, 1985.

Tachikawa, Musashi., *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nagarjuna*, translated by Rolf W. Giebel, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Private Limited, Delhi, 1997.

Yamakawa, H., *Greek philosophy and the Modern World*, Studies in Greek Philosophy Series, The International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1998.

Yamakawa, H., *Kodai Girisia no Sisô* (Ancient Greek Thought), Kodansha, Tokyo, 1993.

Yamakawa, H., *Zenon, Yottuno Gyakuri (Zeno, Four Paradoxes of Motion)*, Kodan-sha, 1996.